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The issue of the Islamic headscarf has generated much controversy in Europe in 
recent years.  What for some is just a piece of cloth worn as a positive declaration of 
faith is, for others, a sinister public statement associated with radical forms of Islam. 
  
It was the introduction of a law in France four years ago, banning the display of 
“conspicuous” religious symbols from the classrooms of all French public schools, 
which first brought the issue of religious dress to wider public attention in Europe.1 
Yet Islamic dress codes have long been controversial,2 having led to disputes in other 
parts of Europe (e.g., the UK,3 Germany,4 Denmark5) as well as further a field (e.g., 
North America,6 the former USSR,7 and South East Asia8). 
 
At the very heart of the controversy surrounding the Islamic headscarf is the issue of 
female autonomy.9 Yet autonomy is especially hard to define in this context. By 
wearing a hijab (or other forms of garments associated with Islam), is an adult female 
exercising her autonomy to dress as she sees fit − or is her “choice” merely illusory, 
because it disguises the fact that such forms of dress are (at least for some) formally 
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mandated by the tenets of their faith? In seeking answers to such questions, an 
obvious reference point is the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR) 
and its associated case law. 
 
In recent years the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has considered 
several cases brought by those challenging state restrictions on religious dress. In a 
continent where there are radically different approaches to such matters,10 the Court 
has the difficult task of ensuring that the ECHR is applied fairly and consistently.  
 
The aim of this short article is to examine the approach of the Court to state imposed 
curbs on Islamic dress. We consider the relevant jurisprudence and suggest that the 
Court has struggled to offer adequate protection to Muslim women who wish to 
manifest their religious belief through their choice of clothing, as guaranteed by 
Article 9(1) of the ECHR.  This is, of course, a highly emotive and extremely 
complex issue, which was always likely to generate controversy when it came to the 
Court’s attention. However, we suggest that one particular problem experienced by 
the Court in this area is the challenge of having to balance the autonomy of an 
individual (or group) and the values of a secular state.  We point out that the Court’s 
approach to autonomy in respect of religious dress (under Article 9 of the ECHR) is in 
marked contrast to that in other areas such as sexuality and sexual identity (under 
Article 8 of the ECHR), where the Court grants the state a much narrower margin of 
appreciation. 
 
We acknowledge that the European Court faces difficult choices when adjudicating in 
this area, but suggest that its approach has been overly restrictive and conservative to 
date. Moreover, with an increasing number of (mainly young) “European Muslims” 
evidently choosing to express their faith in the form of the clothes they wear,11 we 
argue that the Court should be more sensitive to the different ways in which religious 
groups generally, and Muslims in particular, manifest their religion or belief. 
 
II. CONVENTION JURISPRUDENCE ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is “one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ [and is] 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life”.12 Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, there have been several cases 
where Muslim women have challenged a state’s restrictions on what they can wear 
before the Strasbourg bodies. 
 
In Karaduman v Turkey13  a student who had successfully completed her studies at 
Ankara University was refused a degree certificate because she refused to submit a 
photograph of herself bare-headed. Her claim of a breach of Article 9 was rejected by 
the Commission (as it then was) which found there to have been no interference with 
her Article 9 rights which did “not always guarantee the right to behave in public in a 
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way dictated by this conviction”.  The Commission stated that the term “practice” in 
Article 9(1) did not cover all acts motivated or inspired by a religion or conviction, 
and furthermore the applicant had “chosen” to attend a secular university and this 
“naturally” implied an acquiescence in certain rules established to preserve the secular 
nature of the institution and the peaceful coexistence between students of different 
beliefs.14 Consequently the Commission held that “having regard to the requirements 
of secular university system … regulating student’s dress and refusing them 
administrative services, for as long as they [did] not comply with such regulations 
[did] not as such, constitute an interference with freedom of religion and 
conscience”.15  Thus, the Commission held that the refusal did not contravene Article 
9(1), so the permissible restrictions under 9(2) were not even considered. 
 
In the admissibility decision of Dahlab v Switzerland16 a primary school teacher, 
Lucia Dahlab, was dismissed because she insisted on wearing a Muslim headscarf. In 
this case the Court did find that the dismissal constituted an interference with the 
manifestation of religion and therefore did go on to consider the justifications for such 
under Article 9(2). However the Court, having regard to the denominational neutrality 
of the Swiss education system, the “tender age” of the pupils concerned and the 
margin of appreciation in matters of religion, held that the action was not a 
disproportionate interference, but was rather “necessary in [Switzerland’s] democratic 
society”.17  The Court held that the applicant’s decision to wear the headscarf “might 
have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women 
by a precept which is laid down in the Qur’an [which] is hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality.”18 The Court therefore concluded that it was “difficult to 
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect 
for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.”19 
 
The most important case on Islamic dress to come before the Court has been Şahin v 
Turkey.20 In August 1997 Leyla Şahin, a medical student, enrolled at Istanbul 
University.  In February 1998 the Vice Chancellor of the University issued a circular 
prohibiting the wearing on campus of the Islamic headscarf.  Subsequently Şahin was 
refused access to lectures and examinations and refused enrolment on account of her 
wearing an Islamic headscarf. Disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for 
participating in an unauthorised demonstration against the ban and she was suspended 
from the university for a semester, although an amnesty was later issued revoking this 
penalty.  Her attempts to have the circular set aside by the Turkish courts failed.  In 
September 1999 she transferred to Vienna University in order to be able to continue 
her studies. She applied to the European Court of Human Rights claiming inter alia a 
breach of Article 9.21  The Chamber of the Court found there to have been no breach 
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of her rights22  but her request to have the case referred to the Grand Chamber was 
accepted. 
 
The Turkish government argued that the headscarf ban in universities was necessary, 
primarily, to protect the constitutional value of secularism.23  The principle of 
secularism had been stated by the Turkish Constitutional Court to be: the guarantor of 
democratic values; the meeting point of liberty and equality; a check on the state 
according preference to a particular religion; and a safeguard which protected the 
individual from arbitrary interference from the state or extremist movements.24  
Furthermore, and perhaps most critically, the Turkish government stressed that: 
 
“the principle of secularism was a preliminary requisite for a liberal pluralist 
democracy and that there were factors  peculiar to Turkey that meant that the 
principle of secularism had assumed particular importance there compared to other 
democracies . . .  [T]he fact that Turkey was the only Muslim country to have adopted 
a liberal democracy . . . was explained by the fact that it had strictly applied the 
principle of secularism . . .  protection of the secular State was an essential 
prerequisite to the application of the  Convention  in Turkey.” [our emphasis]25 
 
The government thus raised a sinister prospect for the Court to contemplate: that 
democracy itself, and the human rights protection for which it was a prerequisite, 
would be seriously eroded if the constitutional principle of secularism was not 
assiduously guarded.   
 
Faced with the threat of such grave consequences the Court was not inclined to 
second guess the state. It observed that this notion of secularism, one of the 
foundational principles of the Turkish state, was consistent with the values 
underpinning the Convention, in harmony with the rule of law, crucial for the respect 
of human rights, and necessary to protect democracy.  Indeed, the Court noted that: 
 
“there must be borne in mind the impact wearing [the headscarf], presented as a 
compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it . . .  the 
issues at stake include the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ and the 
‘maintenance of public order’.”26 
 
The Strasbourg judges therefore held that because the headscarf had taken on a 
“political significance” in recent years, the restrictions imposed on those wishing to 
wear it were justified by “a pressing social need”. After all, the Court was aware of 
the threat of “extremist political movements” seeking “to impose on society as a 
whole their religious symbols and conception of society founded on religious 
precepts.”27  Accordingly, it was legitimate for the state to take a stance against such 
movements and the headscarf regulations had to be viewed in this context as a 
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measure intended to achieve the legitimate aim of preserving pluralism in the 
university.28  It was understandable that the university authorities should wish to 
preserve the secular nature of the institution and so “consider it contrary to such 
values to allow religious attire, including the Islamic headscarf, to be worn”.  
Crucially, in matters of religion the state was entitled to a margin of appreciation.29 
Thus, the Court held that:   
 
“[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the education community the 
university authorities [were] in principle better placed than an international court to 
evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course . . .[and 
that]  Article 9 [did] not always confer a right to behave in a manner governed by 
religious belief and [did] not confer on people who [did] so the right to disregard 
rules that have proved to be justified”.30 
 
Yet in Şahin there was no suggestion that the applicant herself had in any way posed a 
threat to the values of secularism, nor was there evidence that her wearing of the 
Islamic scarf had provoked disorderly conduct or caused disruption to the everyday 
life of the University.31 Nonetheless, the Court accepted the state’s claim that this 
fact-insensitive law was, in essence, necessary to protect the nation’s secular values – 
and critical for the survival of Turkish democracy. By a majority of sixteen votes to 
one the Grand Chamber of the Court therefore concluded that the measures were a 
proportionate interference with Leyla Şahin’s Article 9 rights.32 
 
III. SECULARISM AND AUTONOMY 
 
The right to manifest religious belief through dress poses some major challenges to 
the European Convention system for the protection of human rights. These 
challenges, it is submitted, originate with a central paradox:  that whilst the majority 
of human rights instruments expressly protect freedom of religion and belief as a 
human right, human rights doctrine itself is “essentially ‘secular’ in nature”.33  
Modern human rights are, at root, a product of the “shift from a religious to a secular 
culture at the time of the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe”.34  
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The principle of secularism is, in essence, a formal mechanism by which there is a 
formal demarcation between the role and function of religion and the state. As a 
consequence, religion is (as a general rule) confined to the private sphere, whereas the 
state agrees not to engage in coercion on matters of belief or conscience. The 
European Court of Human Rights has endorsed this view, emphasizing that the State 
should be: 
 
“the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and 
beliefs [and that] the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with 
any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways 
those beliefs are expressed.”35 
 
Inextricably connected with the principle of secularism in liberal thought is the notion 
of individual autonomy − the notion that “freedom of will and a capacity for self 
directed action within a social environment are the most important of human 
characteristics”.36  One of the reasons why the state is expected to refrain from 
attempting to impose its own views in respect of religion is that to do so would run 
counter to the liberal paradigm that individuals are autonomous agents who should be 
allowed to make their own choices about differing life paths. For Joseph Raz “[t]he 
ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their 
own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives” in 
contrast to “a life of coerced choices” or “a life of no choices, or of drifting through 
life without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.”37 Religions (and their 
associated practices – including the choice of one’s dress) are but one choice available 
to autonomous individuals, and the state’s role is to provide a neutral framework 
within which that choice may be exercised.  A necessary concomitant of a 
commitment to personal autonomy is some form of value pluralism.  The principle of 
autonomy thus presupposes that an individual is accorded a plurality of life paths 
from which to choose. A secular state is one way to achieve this liberal ideal in which 
the autonomous choices of individuals are fostered and respected. 
 
Although this view is reflected in the case law of the European Court,38 this liberal 
discourse of autonomy is difficult to square with the reasons why many believers 
engage in religious practices.  Very often religious practice is not the result of the 
exercise of rational decision making between a plurality of competing life paths.  
From the believer’s perspective it may instead just be a matter of obedience to the 
“will of God”.39  Of course, it must be acknowledged that Muslim women are likely 
                                                 
35 Şahin (GC) at para. 107. See also Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria (2000) 30 EHRR 50, para. 
78; Serif v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 20, para. 57. 
36 D. FELDMAN, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford, OUP, 
2002), p. 9. 
37 J. RAZ, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 369–71. See also R. 
DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth, 1977), p. 272, and J. RAWLS, A Theory of 
Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 17-22.  
38 See Serif v Greece, (2001) 31 EHRR 20, para. 53; and Şahin  (GC), para. 107. 
39 For example the literal meaning of “Islam” is “surrender [to the will of God]”. See K. 
ARMSTRONG, The Battle for God (London, Harper Collins, 2000), p. 375. Some commentators have 
argued that the whole notion of individual rights sits uneasily with some religious cultures. For 
example, the Islamic concept of ummah or community raises potential difficulties for Muslims bringing 
individual human rights claims − see A. BRADNEY, “Law and Religion in Great Britain at the End of 
the Second Christian Millennium” in P.W. EDGE and G. HARVEY, Law and Religion in 
Contemporary Society (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 24 – 6. 
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to wear the hijab for a wide variety of complex reasons.40  But for some, at the very 
least, it is because of their belief that it is required by a divine obligation. After all, 
the Qur’an (believed by Muslims to be the will of God revealed through his prophet 
Muhammad) commands: 
 
And tell believing women that they should lower their glances, guard their private 
parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] to reveal; they 
should let their headscarves fall to cover their necklines and not reveal their charms 




Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer 
garments hang low over them so as to be recognised and not insulted.42 
 
The liberal language of autonomy, so central to human rights doctrine, therefore, may 
not be adequate to explain the obligation on the wearer of the hijab.  
 
It may be that because of this dissonance between the theoretical principles 
underpinning human rights doctrine and the supposed reasons for the wearing of the 
hijab, that the Court has accorded comparatively little weight to autonomy arguments 
when hearing religious dress claims.  In Şahin the Grand Chamber, citing with 
approval the view of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Chamber reiterated that 
“in the Turkish context” the Islamic headscarf was “presented as a compulsory 
religious duty”, and its impact had to be born in mind on those who “[chose] not to 
wear it”.43 The autonomy based arguments of women claiming a breach of their 
religious rights are therefore seriously undermined.  Only the dissenting judge, Judge 
Tulkens, made reference to the autonomous choice of the applicant: 
 
“The applicant, a young adult university student said – and there is nothing to suggest 
that she was not telling the truth – that she wore the headscarf of her own free will. . .  
I fail to see how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from 
following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be taken 
to have freely adopted . . . Paternalism of this sort runs counter to the case law of the 
Court, which has developed a real right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 
8”. (our emphasis) 44 
 
This doctrinal uncertainty – and the issue whether the exercise of autonomy can be a 
valid argument for a woman claiming the right to wear the hijab because of divine 
obligation − is one of the components that is reflected in the widened margin of 
appreciation afforded to states when dealing with religious dress.  This is evident 
when comparing the Court’s approach to cases brought under Article 8 of the ECHR 
in which, as Judge Tulkens noted, the principle of autonomy has been fully 
                                                 
40 See further, D. McGOLDRICK, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf 
Debate in Europe (Oxford, Hart, 2007).  
41 The Qur’an, XXIV (“the Light”) Verse 31. 
42 The Qur’an, XXIII (“the Clans”) Verse 59.  There are many translations of these verses.  
The above are taken from M.A.S. ABDEL HALEEM The Qur’an  (Oxford, OUP, 2004). 
43 Şahin (GC), para. [115]. 
44 Şahin (GC), Judge Tulkens, dissenting, para. 12.  This was in response to the majority’s 
finding that the ban was necessary to protect gender equality. 
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recognised.45  Thus, in cases involving the “most intimate aspect of private life” − 
such as those concerning sexual orientation and gender identity − the Court has found 
that there have to “exist particularly serious reasons before interferences by public 
authorities [can] be legitimate”.46  For example, in Goodwin v UK, a case concerning 
legal recognition of change in gender, the Court stated that: 
 
“Under Article 8 of the Convention … the notion of personal autonomy is an 
important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees, protection is given 
to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of 
their identity as individual human beings.” 47  
 
The language of autonomy is one which the European Court readily understands when 
invoked in Article 8 claims. Its invocation clearly has the effect of narrowing the 
margin of appreciation that the Court is willing to allow and thereby increase the 
protection that is accorded to claimants. In contrast to Article 8 however, the use of 
the language of autonomy to under-gird arguments relating to religious dress under 
Article 9, tends to be much less well received by the Court. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
Whilst secularism is increasingly dominant in many parts of Europe − particularly as 
long-established Christian churches often struggle to retain members48 − faiths such 
as Islam have experienced a period of rapid growth on the continent in recent years.49 
Thus, in having to balance secular and religious values, the European Court has an 
undeniably formidable task. However, in performing this task, the Court has tended to 
give the impression that religion − or rather the manifestation of religious belief 
through symbol and dress − is relatively unimportant in contemporary Europe. It may 
be that the tensions discussed above provide some clue as to why this may be the 
case.  The language of divine obligation, of doing “God’s will” is (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) not readily graspable by the Court.  It sits uneasily with those notions 
of individual autonomy that are central to human rights doctrine.  In contrast, where 
the principle of autonomy can be invoked with relative ease − such as in the case of 
Article 8 claims involving sexuality − the Court has been assiduous in its protection 
of individual freedoms.  
 
The apparent unwillingness of the Court to afford recognition to the principle of 
autonomy in those cases in which Muslim women are claiming the right to wear types 
of religious dress (notwithstanding the fact that these women  themselves are bringing 
these cases), means that these rights are awarded lower levels of protection. There is 
nothing in the text of the Convention to suggest this kind of hierarchy of rights, yet it 
is the clear inference to be drawn from the case law.  To Muslim women such as 
                                                 
45 Ibíd. 
46 Dudgeon v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 149, para. 52. See also Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 
186, para. 46; and Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493, para. 89. 
47 Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123, para. 90. See also Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38, 
para.  92; and Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para. 61.  
48 For example, see C. G. BROWN, The Death of Christian Britain (London, Routledge, 
2001). 
49 Some even claim that Islam is the “world’s fastest growing religion”. On this generally see 
ROBERT A. MOREY, The Islamic Invasion: Confronting the World’s Fastest Growing Religion 
Publisher (Eugene: Oregon, USA, Harvest House, 1992). 
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Leyla Şahin and Lucia Dahlab, as well as those they represent, the text of the 
European Convention appears to protect their rights.  But the Court, the pre-eminent 
guardian of human rights in Europe, appears not to take their rights seriously, 
especially in comparison to those bringing claims more readily understood in terms of 
autonomy.  Such women might be forgiven for perceiving this approach as indicative 
of western “double standards” – differential protection benefiting claimants whose 
claimed rights are closer to the underpinning secular human rights values beloved of 
the Court. 
 
The fact that many young Muslims in parts of Europe are apparently disenchanted 
with secular liberal values has already been well chronicled.50 With Islam often 
portrayed negatively in Europe’s press,51 and claims that Islamophobia is rife in parts 
of the continent,52 a significant proportion of Muslims in Europe have evidently little 
faith that Europe’s governments are committed to defending their interests.53 It is in 
this political context that the European Court’s recent rulings on religious dress must 
be viewed. It would thus be tragic if the Court’s approach to Islamic dress in the cases 
discussed above were to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the sense of alienation of 




In this paper we examine, critically, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the issue of religious dress. We focus on the ruling of the Grand Chamber of the 
Court in Şahin v Turkey, and suggest that it demonstrates the challenge of balancing the 
autonomy of an individual (or group) and the values of a secular state. We argue that the 
balance struck by the Grand Chamber in Şahin is less than satisfactory, and open to serious 
criticism on the ground that it appears to trivialise the manifestation of religious belief. 
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Analizamos en este artículo de forma crítica la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de 
Derechos Humanos acerca de la vestimenta o indumentaria religiosa. Nos centramos en la 
decisión del Pleno del Tribunal en el asunto Sakin v Turkey, que demuestra el reto de hallar 
un equilibrio entre la autonomía de la persona (o grupo) y los valores de un Estado laico o 
secular. Mantenemos que el equilibrio pretendido por el tribunal en el caso Sakin no es 
satisfactorio y justifica una seria crítica, en la medida en que trivializa la manifestación de las 
creencias religiosas. 
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